6. Youth Justice — Jurisdiction, Procedure & Sentencing (Vic)¶
Scope and currency
Cheat sheet · Youth Justice Act 2024 (Vic) (YJA) + Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) (CYFA) · current to 1 July 2026 — verify commencements before relying
Two Acts, one child.
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The Youth Justice Act 2024 is the standalone youth-crime code (jurisdiction, diversion, sentencing, custody);
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The Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 keeps child protection and, transitionally, parallel criminal-jurisdiction provisions (ss 356, 516, 516A).
Every youth matter runs the gates in order:
Age & capacity (§1) → can the Children’s Court finally determine it? (§2) → pre-trial (§3) → sentence (§4).
Key authorities are collected at §6.
1 · Age & criminal capacity — the first gate¶
GATE A Age at the date of the offence
How old was the child when the offence was allegedly committed? → Under 12: conclusive immunity (Irrebuttable) — s 10 YJA: a child under 12 cannot commit an offence. Irrebuttable; no evidence of maturity or malice displaces it. Cannot be charged → 12 or 13: doli incapax presumed — s 11(1) YJA. Rebuttable only as at Gate A1. → 14–17: full capacity, but custody/sentencing limits apply (§4). ‘Designated offence’ rules can force the higher court and adult sentencing.
GATE A1 Rebutting doli incapax (12–13)
Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the child knew, at the time, the conduct was seriously wrong in a moral sense — s 11(2), s 11(3)© YJA; RP v The Queen [2016] HCA 53. ‘Seriously’/‘gravely’ wrong, not merely naughty or mischievous. What suffices varies with the child and the allegation (BDO v The Queen). → Insufficient: the seriousness of the act alone — s 11(3)(b): knowledge cannot be inferred merely from doing of act itself (RP v The Queen [2016] HCA 53, disapproving R v ALH [2003] VSCA 129). Mere participation in a fatal group attack is not enough absent clear, often expert, proof (DPP v PM [2023] VSC 560). Running away, hiding or lying is equivocal (C v DPP). → Sufficient: positive evidence of moral comprehension — admissions in the police interview, the child’s school progress and home life, and formal psychological assessment; extended, surreptitious conduct may itself be capable of rebutting (Allison v The Queen [2021] VSCA 308). → Context evidence: uncharged acts committed before 14 may be admitted as context for later offending, and the prosecution need not prove the child knew those earlier acts were ‘seriously wrong’ (DPP v Martin [2016] VSCA 219).
GATE A2 Who decides capacity, and when
→ Higher courts: s 206A(1) Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (inserted by the YJA) — for a 12/13 offence not heard summarily, the court may order the doli incapax issue tried by judge alone, pre-trial, no jury (after indictment, before empanelment). Not satisfied BRD → charge dismissed = acquittal. Capacity found → trial proceeds; finding binding, not re-litigated before the jury. → Children’s Court (summary): a threshold issue for the sitting magistrate. — s 13 YJA: prosecutor must formally review summary charges in a prosecution against 12/13yo. The prosecutor must evaluate whether there is "sufficient admissible evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the child knew at the time of the alleged commission of the offence that the child's conduct was seriously wrong having regard to section 11(3)". If this standard is not met, the prosecutor must consider withdrawing the charge before the hearing.
2 · Jurisdiction & uplift — can the Children’s Court finally determine it?¶
Default: the Children’s Court Criminal Division hears indictable offences summarily unless an exclusion, presumptive uplift, election or discretionary refusal sends the matter up. Run Gates 1–5 in order.
GATE 1 Mandatory exclusion — no jurisdiction
Is the charge a fatal / excluded offence? (s 156(1)(a) YJA; s 516(1)(b) CYFA) → Excluded → committal only, then trial in the higher court (see Gate 2). The Children’s Court cannot hear and determine these — no discretion to resist.
| Excluded offence — no jurisdiction (s 156(1)(a) YJA; s 516(1)(b) CYFA) | Crimes Act 1958 ref |
|---|---|
| Murder | — |
| Attempted murder | — |
| Manslaughter | — |
| Child homicide | s 5A |
| Homicide by firearm | s 5B |
| Arson causing death | s 197A |
| Culpable driving causing death | s 318 |
| A ‘designated offence’ committed when the child was 15 or over | see note |
Designated offence (s 516(7) CYFA — inserted by the Justice Legislation Amendment (Community Safety) Act 2025):
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intentionally causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence (s 15A) — Crimes Act 1958.;
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recklessly causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence (s 15B) — Crimes Act 1958.;
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home invasion (s 77A) — Crimes Act 1958.;
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aggravated home invasion (s 77B) — Crimes Act 1958.;
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aggravated carjacking (s 79A) — Crimes Act 1958.
At 15+ these are mandatory-exclusion; at 14 they are presumptively uplifted (Gate 3).
GATE 2 Destination court on uplift
→ Supreme Court: murder, attempted murder, treason or any offence named in s 36A County Court Act 1958 → County Court: any other uplifted charge.
GATE 3 Presumptive uplift — must NOT be heard summarily unless…
Jurisdiction exists, but summary hearing is presumptively refused for the triggers below. Each has a statutory ‘unless’ — that ‘unless’ is where you resist the uplift (see the next box). → Category A serious youth offence at 16+: (e.g. terrorism) — s 356(6) CYFA: no summary hearing unless the child or prosecution requests it, sentencing options are adequate, and exceptional circumstances apply (victim’s interests, extreme vulnerability, or substantial and compelling reasons). → Designated offence at 14: s 356(7A) CYFA; carjacking at 14+ — s 356(7C) CYFA. → Related offence while already committed for trial: s 159(1) YJA; s 356(8A) CYFA — no summary hearing where the child is already committed for trial for another indictable offence and they are ‘related offences’, unless a substantial and compelling reason to retain.
GATE 3 ↺ Resisting the uplift — keep it in the Children’s Court
Attack the statutory ‘unless’ that matches the trigger; the same arguments answer a discretionary uplift under Gate 5. The Court sheds its ‘embracive jurisdiction’ only with great reluctance (K v Children’s Court of Victoria). → Satisfy the s 356(6) limbs (Category A at 16+): the Court may still hear it summarily where (a) the child (or prosecution) requests summary hearing, (b) the available youth sentencing options are adequate to the offending, and © exceptional circumstances apply — the victim’s interests, the child’s extreme vulnerability, or other substantial and compelling reasons. Establish all three. → Show a substantial and compelling reason to retain: on the related-offence refusal (s 159(1) YJA; s 356(8A) CYFA), persuade the Court to keep the related offence despite the existing committal. → Defeat ‘exceptional circumstances’ (s 158 YJA; s 356A CYFA): the gateway to uplift is that YJA/CYFA sentencing options are inadequate — so resist by showing the youth options are adequate (‘custody as a last resort’, s 208 YJA). The rarity or unusual nature of the charge is not itself exceptional and the Children’s Court retains adequate sentencing powers (CDPP v Carrick [2022] VChC 3); reserve uplift for the ‘very unusual’ case (K v Children’s Court of Victoria). Work the s 158(2)–(3) / s 356A factors (seriousness & role, nature of offence, the child’s age/maturity/development/disability/mental illness, prior offending, custody/parole status) in the child’s favour. → Protect the child’s election (Gate 4): the right to elect trial is the child’s — a child who does not object keeps summary determination; the prosecution cannot force a jury by election. If under 15 and unrepresented, the parent may object for the child (s 157(3)). → Run doli incapax first (12–13): capacity (Gate A1) can defeat the charge outright, whatever the forum — resolve it before conceding any uplift.
GATE 4 Child’s election
Before any evidence, has the child been told of the right to object to summary hearing? (s 157(2) YJA; s 356(1) CYFA) → Child objects: the Court must not determine summarily (s 157(1) YJA; s 356(3)(a) CYFA) → committal stream. If under 15 and unrepresented, the parent may object for the child (s 157(3) YJA; s 356(4) CYFA). → No objection: the Court may proceed summarily (subject to Gate 5).
GATE 5 Discretionary refusal — exceptional circumstances
At any stage the Court may find the charge unsuitable for summary hearing — s 158(1) YJA; s 356(3)(b) CYFA. ‘Exceptional circumstances’ means ‘very unusual’, decided case-by-case, and the Children’s Court relinquishes jurisdiction only with great reluctance (K v Children’s Court of Victoria); the mere rarity of a charge is not exceptional and the Court retains adequate sentencing powers (CDPP v Carrick [2022] VChC 3). The gateway is that YJA/CYFA sentencing options are inadequate (s 158(2)–(3) YJA; s 356A CYFA), having regard to the factors below. To resist, see the Gate 3 ↺ box.
Exceptional-circumstances factors (s 158(2)–(3) YJA; s 356A CYFA)¶
• Seriousness of the conduct — including impact on victims and the role of the accused.
• Nature of the offence — the character of the charge.
• The child — age, maturity, stage of development, disability or mental illness.
• Prior offending — seriousness, nature and number.
• Custodial/parole status — whether committed while in youth justice custody or on parole.
Committal & uplift procedure. The Court must conduct a committal proceeding for an indictable charge not heard summarily (s 156(2) YJA; s 356(3) CYFA); jurisdiction under s 516(1)© CYFA (commit for trial + remand/bail, or discharge under s 126(4) Criminal Procedure Act 2009). Filing hearing within 7 days (remanded) or 28 days (on summons) — Order 2A, Children’s Court Criminal Procedure Rules 2019. The traditional committal test (‘evidence of sufficient weight to support a conviction’) was removed by the Justice Legislation Amendment (Committals) Act 2025 (in force 28 December 2025).
Joint committal with adult co-accused (s 516A CYFA). Available where the charges can be joined in one indictment and the child was 15+ when the proceeding commenced, for murder / attempted murder / manslaughter / child homicide / homicide by firearm / arson causing death / culpable driving causing death, or (on or after 27 February 2026) a designated offence. Both courts make a jurisdictional order under s 25 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989; regard to s 516A(2) factors (age; ability to participate/instruct; effect on victims; duration; number of witnesses). If ordered, the CYFA applies to the child and the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 to the adult, so far as practicable (s 516A(6)).
3 · Police powers & pre-trial¶
Interviews & admissions. s 464E Crimes Act 1958 — police must not question a child in custody unless a parent/guardian is present, or (if unavailable) an independent person. Statutory preference is for a parent/guardian. An independent person must actively protect the child (advise of the right to silence; not a passive observer). s 71 YJA — no questioning about an offence where the child has been taken into care and control under police transport powers. Breach → record of interview liable to exclusion under the unfairness discretion, s 90 Evidence Act 2008 — e.g. Victoria Police v AC [2024] VChC 2 (ROI of a First Nations child with an intellectual disability excluded where police failed to contact the guardian despite a permanent care order, and the independent person failed to intervene or caution).
Forensic samples — age gates (Crimes Act 1958)¶
| Procedure | Rule (turns on age at the time of the alleged act) | Provision |
|---|---|---|
| Fingerprints | Prohibited if the child was under 12; permitted only 12 to under 15. | s 464L(1), (2), (7) |
| Forensic / compulsory procedure | Prohibited if the child was under 12; restricted to 12 to under 18. | s 464U(1), (2), (7) |
| Post-offence sample | Applies to a child 12+ (forensic-sample offence). | s 464ZF(1) |
| Destruction on diversion | DNA destroyed on a youth warning/caution, or a finalised diversion conference / discharge without a finding of guilt. | s 464SD(2)(h) |
| Destruction — under-12s | All samples/profiles from under-12s destroyed within 12 months of commencement of Part 1.2 YJA. | s 464ZGFD |
Unrepresented child (s 171 YJA). Not an absolute bar. The Court must adjourn a hearing — criminal responsibility, bail, committal, summary determination, sentencing or contravention — to let an unrepresented child obtain representation (s 171(1)); it must not resume unless the child is represented, or the Court is satisfied the child had a reasonable opportunity and failed to take it (s 171(2)). Same in appeals — s 396(2). Under 15 and unrepresented: the parent may object to summary jurisdiction (s 157(3)).
Pre-court diversion hierarchy (s 92(1) YJA — police must consider IN ORDER before charging)¶
• 1 · Youth warning (Part 4.2): if taking no action is inappropriate and there is sufficient evidence to charge; verbal or written, anywhere; officer must explain its nature and effect plainly (s 99).
• 2 · Youth caution (Part 4.3): if a warning is inappropriate; issued by a sergeant+ (or an authorised officer); requires the child’s consent after explanation (s 104(1)); may be delivered by a respected cultural/religious community member, e.g. an Aboriginal Elder (s 108).
• 3 · Early diversion group conference (Part 4.4): if warning/caution inappropriate; objects — repair harm, self-reflection, address causes (s 116); produces an ‘early diversion outcome plan’; completion → charges withdrawn.
4 · Sentencing — the youth hierarchy¶
s 240(1) YJA sets a statutory hierarchy the Children’s Court must consider in ascending order of severity. The YJA replaced the former CYFA dispositions. Totality governs multi-charge youth matters — comparable-case statistics are a guide only, and the total effective sentence must be a just measure of the criminality (Boxer v The Queen [2021] VSCA 300; Allison v The Queen [2021] VSCA 308).
Youth sentencing hierarchy (Youth Justice Act 2024)¶
| Order — ascending severity | Key criteria / limit | Conviction? |
|---|---|---|
| Dismissal — without (s 243) or with (s 244) formal warning | No order beyond the warning. | No (s 242(a)–(b)) |
| Good behaviour order (s 245) | Child’s consent; max 6m / 12m exc (under 15), 12m / 18m exc (15+) — s 248. | No (s 242©) |
| Fine (s 249) | Only if 15+ and has means to pay (s 249(2)); max 5 pu/offence, 10 pu aggregate (s 252). | No (s 242(d)) |
| Community service order (s 263) | Unpaid activities within a 6-month period. | No if <15; discretion 15+ (s 262) |
| Probation (s 269) | Consent; max 6m / 12m exc (under 15), 12m / 18m exc (15+) — s 272. | No if <15; discretion 15+ (s 262) |
| Youth supervision & support order (s 273) — replaces CYFA YSO | Consent; intensive support; max 6m / 12m exc (under 15), 12m / 24m exc (15+) — s 278. | No if <15; discretion 15+ (s 262) |
| Youth control order (s 280) — replaces CYFA YAO | Only where imprisonment-level and custody otherwise likely (s 280(1)–(2)); max 12m, not beyond the 21st birthday — s 284. | No if <15; discretion 15+ (s 262) |
| Youth justice custodial order (s 325) | Last resort (s 208); age bar + caps — see below. | — |
Custody (s 324–327 YJA). A single Youth Justice Custodial Order (s 325) — the YJA abolished the Youth Residential Centre / Youth Justice Centre split. No detention on a child under 14 at the time of the offence unless it is a Category A or B serious youth offence (or another serious violent offence) and the Court is reasonably satisfied of a serious risk to community safety (s 324); the child must be under 21 at sentencing (s 325(2)(a)). Children’s Court caps (s 327): under 15 — 1 yr/offence, 2 yr aggregate; 15 to under 21 — 3 yr/offence, 4 yr aggregate. Custody is a genuine last resort: for Aboriginal youths weigh systemic over-representation and the trauma of custody (Re Campbell [2025] VSC 591); holding children in adult maximum-security conditions unjustifiably limits their Charter rights (Certain Children v Minister for Families & Children; s 22(1) Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006).
§4A Higher-court sentencing (County / Supreme)
→ General indictable stream: s 241(1) YJA — the higher court may exercise the Children’s Court’s sentencing powers (impose youth sentences); if it orders detention it must be a youth justice custodial order under Subdiv 4, Div 2, Pt 3 of the Sentencing Act 1991. Aged 16–17 at the offence → must have regard to adult minimum non-parole periods (s 241(2)). Where a youth is in the higher court only because of related charges outside the Children’s Court, youth sentencing principles still apply and general deterrence is excluded (CNK v The Queen (2011) 32 VR 64; s 362 CYFA). Max youth detention a higher court may order under s 32(3)(b) Sentencing Act 1991 is 4 years. → ‘Adult crime, adult time’ (2025 reforms): a 14–17-year-old mandatorily/presumptively uplifted for a designated offence is sentenced strictly under the adult Sentencing Act 1991 — ‘custody as a last resort’ (s 208 YJA) is disapplied; community protection and denunciation prioritised. Once the court concludes youth dispositions are inadequate and adult custody is necessary, general deterrence applies (ameliorated by youth) (DPP v Anderson (2013) 228 A Crim R 128; Dale Cairns v The Queen). Dual track survives (s 32(1) — youth custodial centre if reasonable rehabilitation prospects / particularly impressionable or immature) but the Children’s Court maximums fall away → adult-length exposure.
Ancillary — restitution & compensation (arson etc.). s 240(3) YJA — the Court may order restitution/compensation in addition to any sentence; Part 4 of the Sentencing Act 1991 applies with modifications (s 329(1)). For property damage: the court must ask if a compensation application will be made (s 86AA(1)); it may order compensation up to the value lost/damaged (s 86(1)). s 329(1)(a) YJA changes s 86(2) ‘may’ → ‘must’: the court must weigh the child’s financial circumstances and the burden. Cap: the Children’s Court can order a child to pay no more than $1,000 under Part 4 (s 329(2) YJA).
5 · Legislation & currency¶
Core sources (2026)¶
• Youth Justice Act 2024 (Vic): the standalone youth-justice code — capacity, jurisdiction, diversion, sentencing, custody.
• Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic): retains child protection, therapeutic treatment and non-criminal Children’s Court functions; still carries parallel criminal-jurisdiction provisions (ss 356, 516, 516A) in transition.
• Crimes Act 1958 (Vic): substantive offences; police questioning and forensic procedures (ss 464E, 464L, 464U, 464ZF).
• Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic): youth custodial orders (Pt 3 Div 2 Subdiv 4), dual track (s 32), restitution/compensation (Pt 4).
• Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic): s 206A judge-alone doli incapax determination.
• Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic): s 22(1) humane treatment in custody; age-appropriate detention.
• Bail Act 1977 (Vic) + Bail Regulations 2022: youth bail/remand (see currency flags).
• Bench books / research materials: Judicial College Children’s Court Bench Book; Charter of Human Rights Bench Book; Children’s Court research materials.
Currency watch¶
• 10 September 2024 — Youth Justice Act 2024 received Royal Assent (s 2 staged commencement).
• 30 September 2025 — default/backstop commencement of the core YJA provisions (Ch 1 exc. Pt 1.3; Ch 3; Ch 19–20; Ch 22): MACR raised 10 → 12 and doli incapax codified (ss 10–11).
• 28 December 2025 — Justice Legislation Amendment (Committals) Act 2025: the committal test removed.
• 27 February 2026 — designated offences brought within joint-committal / ‘adult time’ reach.
• 30 September 2026 / 2027 — CYFA Ch 20 amendments repealed (2026); YJA Ch 19 transitional provisions repealed (2027).
• Remaining provisions — commence on proclamation (s 2(1)); confirm what is in force on exam day.
Parallel YJA / CYFA numbering (transition)
The sources cite the jurisdiction/uplift rules under both the YJA (ss 156–159) and the CYFA (ss 356, 516). Treat the YJA as the primary code and confirm which numbering is operative on exam day.
6 · Key authorities¶
| Authority | Proposition (per the source material) | Bites at |
|---|---|---|
| CDPP v Carrick [2022] VChC 3 | Rarity / unusual nature of a charge (e.g. terrorism vs a 13-yo) is not ‘exceptional circumstances’ justifying uplift; the Children’s Court retains adequate sentencing powers. | Gates 3 ↺ / 5 (s 356(3)(b)) |
| K v Children’s Court of Victoria | ‘Exceptional circumstances’ = ‘very unusual’; decided case-by-case; the Court relinquishes its ‘embracive jurisdiction’ only with great reluctance. | Gate 5 (s 356(3)) |
| Victoria Police v AC [2024] VChC 2 | ROI of a First Nations child with an intellectual disability excluded where police failed to contact the guardian and the independent person failed to intervene/caution. | §3 (s 464E; s 90 Evidence Act) |
| Re Campbell [2025] VSC 591 | For Aboriginal youths, weigh historical/systemic over-representation and the profound trauma of custody. | §4 custody (last resort) |
| Certain Children v Minister for Families & Children | Detaining children in maximum-security adult prison conditions unjustifiably limits their human rights. | §4 (s 22(1) Charter) |
| Re JB | The criminogenic impact of further custody on an impressionable youth can found exceptional circumstances for bail. | Bail (last resort) |
| Boxer v The Queen [2021] VSCA 300 | Comparable-case statistics guide only; totality must make the total effective sentence a just measure of criminality (serious youth sexual offending). | §4 (totality/parity) |
| Allison v The Queen [2021] VSCA 308 | Sensible cumulation with totality to avoid double-punishment; extended, surreptitious conduct may itself rebut doli incapax. | §4 / Gate A1 |
| CNK v The Queen (2011) 32 VR 64 | Higher court sentencing a youth on charges that could have been in the Children’s Court (but for related charges) applies youth principles; general deterrence excluded. | §4A (s 362 CYFA) |
| DPP v Anderson (2013) 228 A Crim R 128 | Where CYFA dispositions are inadequate and adult custody is necessary, CYFA doesn’t apply and general deterrence applies (ameliorated by youth). | §4A (adult time / dual track) |
| Dale Cairns v The Queen | General deterrence remains relevant when a youth is sentenced to adult prison (not a Children’s Court sentence). | §4A |
| RP v The Queen [2016] HCA 53 | Rebut doli incapax only by proof BRD the child knew the conduct was ‘seriously wrong’ morally; not inferred from the act. | Gate A1 |
| BDO v The Queen | What rebuts the presumption varies with the allegation and the individual child’s intellectual/moral development. | Gate A1 |
| DPP v PM [2023] VSC 560 | A 13-yo’s role in a fatal group attack was insufficient to rebut without clear (often expert) proof of moral capacity. | Gate A1 |
| DPP v Martin [2016] VSCA 219 | Uncharged acts before 14 admissible as ‘context evidence’; no need to prove the child knew those were ‘seriously wrong’. | Gate A1 |
| R v ALH [2003] VSCA 129 | Doli incapax protects the 10–14 ‘intermediate zone’ of moral development — children shielded by the criminal law, not oppressed by it. | Gate A1 (rationale) |
7 · Child recruitment offences¶
Recruiting a child to engage in criminal activity — s 321LB (Division 11A, Pt I, Crimes Act 1958 (Vic))¶
| Element | Rule |
|---|---|
| Definitions (s 321LA) | Adult = 18 years or over. Child = under 18 years. Recruit = defined exhaustively to mean incite, direct or induce. Criminal activity = conduct constituting an offence punishable on first conviction with imprisonment for life or for a term of 5 years or more. |
| Actus reus (s 321LB(1)) | - the accused was an adult at the time of the recruitment; - the accused recruited (incited, directed or induced) another person; - the recruitment was to engage in criminal activity; and - the person recruited was a child. Under s 321LB(3), the ages of the adult and the child are ascertained at the time of the recruitment. |
| Mens rea | (1) Knowledge of age — the accused recruited the other person knowing they were a child. (2) Knowledge of likelihood (s 321LB(2)) — the accused knew it was likely the child would engage in the criminal activity that was the subject of the recruiting. |
| Key exemptions / procedural rules | s 321LA(2) — conduct by a child may constitute "criminal activity" even if the child is presumed incapable of committing the offence under s 10 or s 11 Youth Justice Act 2024 (Vic) — doli incapax (conclusive under 12; rebuttable for 12–13) does not shield the recruiting adult. s 321LC — the adult may be found guilty whether or not the child actually engages in the criminal activity, and whether or not the child is ever prosecuted or found guilty of any offence. s 321LD — to avoid double punishment, an adult is not liable to be convicted of both s 321LB(1) recruiting and general incitement under s 321G(1) for the same conduct. |
| Penalty | Level 4 imprisonment — 15 years maximum. |
Aggravated deceptive recruiting for commercial sexual services — s 53G (Subdivision (8F) "Sexual servitude", Crimes Act 1958 (Vic))¶
| Element | Rule |
|---|---|
| Basic offence (s 53F(1)) | A commits an offence if A deceives B about the fact that an engagement will involve B providing commercial sexual services, and A intends to induce B to enter that engagement. Max: Level 6 imprisonment — 5 years. |
| Aggravating factors (s 53G(1)) | - A commits the basic s 53F(1) offence; - B is under 18 years; and - (3) A knows B is, or probably is, under 18 years. |
| Penalty | Level 5 imprisonment — 10 years maximum (doubled from the base offence, reflecting the vulnerability of child victims). |
Key exam distinctions¶
| Feature | Recruiting a child to criminal activity (s 321LB) | Aggravated deceptive recruiting (s 53G) |
|---|---|---|
| Protected victim | Child under 18 | Child under 18 |
| Prohibited conduct | Inciting, directing or inducing serious criminal activity (offences carrying 5+ years / life) | Deceiving a person into an engagement involving commercial sexual services |
| Accused status | Must be an adult (18+) | Can be any age (subject to general criminal responsibility) |
| Mental state re: age | Positive knowledge that the victim is a child | Knowledge that the child is, or probably is, under 18 |
| Maximum penalty | 15 years (Level 4) | 10 years (Level 5) |