1. Legal Ethics for Victorian Criminal Practice — Comprehensive Cheat Sheet¶
Scope and currency
Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors' Conduct Rules 2015 (as amended to 1 July 2026) · Legal Profession Uniform Law ss 296–298 (applied by the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic)) · Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) disclosure regime · Rule text verified verbatim against the AustLII consolidation "as at 1 July 2026", checked 14 August 2026
How to use this sheet. Almost every ethics question in a criminal paper is really one question — which duty governs here, and what does it require me to do? — and almost every wrong answer comes from citing the right principle under the wrong rule number. This sheet is organised as a decision tree keyed to the dilemma actually presented by the facts, because the rules are not interchangeable: what you must do when your client tells you something differs from what you must do when a third party tells you the same thing, and the rule that permits you to speak differs according to whether the risk is a future offence, imminent physical harm, or intended disobedience of a court order. Work the gates in order. The rule text quoted here is verbatim from the current consolidation, which was amended on 1 April 2022 and again on 1 July 2026 — six weeks before the exam — and a great deal of circulating material still reproduces the 2015 text.
The single highest-yield currency point on this sheet
The ASCR were amended by the Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors' Conduct Amendment Rules 2026 (2026 No 276), published 19 June 2026 and commencing 1 July 2026. Two rules changed. Rule 8.1 now reads "A solicitor must only accept and follow a client's lawful, proper and competent instructions" — the obligation is no longer merely to follow proper instructions but to decline improper ones at the point of acceptance. Rule 13 gained a new subrule 13.4 defining "just cause" for termination under r 13.1.3, including at 13.4.3 "any circumstance where a client has not provided all information requested of them that is required to fulfil a solicitor's statutory obligations" — the hook for the anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing obligations extended to legal practitioners from 1 July 2026. Anything written before mid-2026 will not have either change.
And the trap that precedes it
A separate and much larger amendment commenced 1 April 2022, rewriting or amending rules 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43 and the Glossary, inserting r 11A, and repealing r 41. Among other things it repealed r 20.1.4 (the former obligation to advise the client that the court should be informed and to request authority), rewrote r 20.2 into eight sub-rules, changed the heading of r 19 from "Frankness in court" to "Duty to the court", and inserted r 21.8–21.9 on questioning alleged victims in family violence and sexual offence proceedings. If your notes quote the 2015 text, they are two amendments out of date.
1. The hierarchy — start every answer here¶
Rule 3.1 states the organising principle in a single sentence: "A solicitor's duty to the court and the administration of justice is paramount and prevails to the extent of inconsistency with any other duty." This is not rhetoric; it is the conflict-of-duties rule that decides every question on this sheet. The common law source is Giannarelli v Wraith [1988] HCA 52; (1988) 165 CLR 543, where Mason CJ explained at 556 that performance of the paramount duty "will require [counsel] to act in a variety of ways to the possible disadvantage of his client" — counsel must not mislead the court, must not cast unjustifiable aspersions on any party or witness, must not withhold documents and authorities detracting from the client's case, and on noticing an irregularity in a criminal trial must take the point then rather than reserve it for appeal.
Rule 4.1 sets out the other fundamental duties, and the order in which they are listed is worth remembering because it is the order in which they yield to r 3.1. A solicitor must (4.1.1) act in the best interests of a client in any matter in which the solicitor represents the client; (4.1.2) be honest and courteous in all dealings in the course of legal practice; (4.1.3) deliver legal services competently, diligently and as promptly as reasonably possible; (4.1.4) avoid any compromise to their integrity and professional independence; and (4.1.5) comply with these Rules and the law. Rule 5.1, substituted in 2022, prohibits conduct "in the course of legal practice or otherwise" which demonstrates that the solicitor is not a fit and proper person to practise law, or which is likely to a material degree to be prejudicial to or diminish public confidence in the administration of justice, or to bring the profession into disrepute — note that it reaches private conduct.
2. The decision sequence¶
GATE 0 Where did the information come from? — the question that selects the rule
Did you learn the troubling fact from your client (or a witness called on the client's behalf), or from someone else? This is the threshold that most candidates skip, and it determines the entire analysis. Rule 20.1 is engaged only where the solicitor learns the relevant matter "as a result of information provided by the client or a witness called on behalf of the client", and only where that occurs during a hearing, or after judgment or decision is reserved and while it remains pending. If the source is a third party — a disgruntled former employee, the opponent, a journalist, an anonymous letter — r 20.1 does not bite at all. Where r 20.1 is not engaged, the operative rules are r 19.1 (must not deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the court), r 19.2 (must correct a misleading statement made by the solicitor), and r 21.3 (must not allege a matter of fact without a proper basis). The practical duty in that situation is to inquire: an untested third-party assertion neither can be ignored nor acted upon as though proved. → From the client or the client's witness: go to Gate 2 (confession of guilt) or Gate 3 (lie, falsification or suppression), as the facts require. → From a third party: go to Gate 1 and stay within rr 19 and 21. Do not cite r 20.1.
GATE 1 Have you misled the court, or merely failed to correct someone else? (r 19)
Rule 19.1 — "A solicitor must not deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the court." This covers misleading by silence where the silence maintains a false premise the solicitor has previously advanced. Rule 19.2 — "A solicitor must take all necessary steps to correct any misleading statement made by the solicitor to a court as soon as possible after the solicitor becomes aware that the statement was misleading." The obligation attaches to your own statements, and it is mandatory and immediate. Rule 19.3 — "A solicitor will not have made a misleading statement to a court simply by failing to correct an error in a statement made to the court by the opponent or any other person." You are not the prosecutor's keeper. The distinction between correcting your own misleading submission (mandatory) and volunteering a correction of the opponent's error (not required, and generally impermissible without instructions) is where the marks are. Other limbs of r 19 that are examinable in a criminal context. Rule 19.4 requires a solicitor seeking interlocutory relief on an ex parte application to disclose all factual or legal matters within the solicitor's knowledge, not protected by privilege, which the solicitor has reasonable grounds to believe would support an argument against granting the relief or limiting its terms adversely to the client; 19.5 requires the solicitor to seek instructions to waive privilege where the matters are privileged and, if the client refuses, to advise the client of the consequences and to tell the court that the solicitor cannot assure it that all matters which should be disclosed have been disclosed. Rule 19.6 requires disclosure of any binding authority, any Australian appellate authority where there is none binding, and any applicable legislation known to the solicitor and directly in point against the client's case. Rule 19.10 — a compact and very examinable provision — states that "a solicitor who knows or suspects that the prosecution is unaware of the client's previous conviction must not ask a prosecution witness whether there are previous convictions, in the hope of a negative answer." Rule 19.11 requires the solicitor to inform the court of any misapprehension by the court as to the effect of an order it is making. Note that 19.12, on an opponent's mistaken concession, is expressly confined to civil proceedings.
GATE 2 The client confesses guilt but maintains a plea of not guilty (r 20.2)
This is the classic criminal ethics question and the rule was rewritten in 2022 into eight sub-rules. A solicitor whose client in criminal proceedings confesses guilt to the solicitor but maintains a plea of not guilty — 20.2.1 may, subject to the client accepting the constraints in rr 20.2.2–20.2.8 but not otherwise, continue to act in the client's defence; 20.2.2 must not falsely suggest that some other person committed the offence charged; 20.2.3 must not set up an affirmative case inconsistent with the confession; 20.2.4 must ensure that the prosecution is put to proof on its case; 20.2.5 may argue that the evidence as a whole does not prove that the client is guilty of the offence charged; 20.2.6 may argue that for some reason of law the client is not guilty of the offence charged; 20.2.7 may argue that for another reason not prohibited by r 20.2.2 or r 20.2.3 the client should not be convicted; and 20.2.8 must not continue to act if the client insists on giving evidence denying guilt or requires the making of a statement asserting the client's innocence. Two features of the 2022 rewrite are worth noticing. First, 20.2.4 is a positive duty, not a permission: putting the prosecution to proof is something the solicitor must do, and it is the reason continuing to act is proper at all. Second, the 2015 rule's requirement to cease acting where there was time for another solicitor to take over has gone; the modern trigger for ceasing is the specific one in 20.2.8. The common law authority is Tuckiar v The King [1934] HCA 49; (1934) 52 CLR 335, where counsel disclosed his client's admission of guilt to the trial judge. The High Court held this an improper breach of confidence: counsel's duty, absent serious embarrassment, was not to make the admission public but to test the Crown case on the evidence. The conviction was quashed and the prisoner discharged. The case is authority both for the constraint (no affirmative inconsistent case) and for the freedom (the Crown must still be put to proof) — and above all for the proposition that you do not tell the court.
GATE 3 The client or the client's witness has lied, falsified or suppressed (r 20.1)
Rule 20.1 applies where, as a result of information provided by the client or a witness called on behalf of the client, the solicitor learns during a hearing, or after judgment or decision is reserved and while it remains pending, that the client or such a witness — 20.1.1 has lied in a material particular to the court or procured another to lie; 20.1.2 has falsified or procured the falsification of a document which has been tendered; or 20.1.3 has suppressed or procured the suppression of material evidence on a topic where there was a positive duty of disclosure to the court. The consequence is now contained in a single surviving sub-rule. 20.1.5 — the solicitor "must refuse to take any further part in the case unless the client authorises the solicitor to inform the court of the lie, falsification or suppression, and must promptly inform the court of the lie, falsification or suppression upon the client authorising the solicitor to do so, but otherwise may not inform the court." The 2022 change matters. The former r 20.1.4 — which required the solicitor to advise the client that the court should be informed and to request authority — was repealed. The rule as it now stands does not command you to seek authority; it gives the client the choice between authorising disclosure and losing the solicitor. In practice you will still advise and seek authority, but do not state the repealed rule as a current obligation. The absolute limit. In no circumstance may the solicitor inform the court without authority. Withdrawal is the sanction, and the reason for withdrawal is not disclosed: you tell the court you are ethically embarrassed and must withdraw, and no more. Compare Meek v Fleming [1961] 2 QB 366 (English Court of Appeal), where counsel concealed from the court that the police witness had been demoted; the court was misled by half-truth and silence and a new trial was ordered — the case marks the boundary between permissible silence and impermissible concealment.
GATE 4 The client tells you they intend to disobey a court order (r 20.3)
Has the client informed you of an intention to disobey — a bail condition, an intervention order, a suppression order, an order for production? Rule 20.3 is narrow and is frequently over-read. It is engaged only where "a solicitor's client informs the solicitor that the client intends to disobey a court's order". It is not a general rule about a client who has committed, or is committing, an offence. Where it applies the solicitor must — 20.3.1 advise the client against that course and warn the client of its dangers; 20.3.2 not advise the client how to carry out or conceal that course; and 20.3.3 not inform the court or the opponent of the client's intention unless (i) the client has authorised the solicitor to do so beforehand, or (ii) the solicitor believes on reasonable grounds that the client's conduct constitutes a threat to any person's safety. Note the sub-numbering: the safety permission is at r 20.3.3(ii) — a romanette, not a fourth-level number. In a Victorian criminal fact pattern the orders most likely to engage this rule are a bail condition, a family violence intervention order, and a suppression order. Where the client has committed or intends to commit an offence that is not disobedience of a court order, the permission to speak comes not from r 20.3 but from the confidentiality exceptions at Gate 5.
GATE 5 May I disclose? — confidentiality and its six exceptions (r 9)
Rule 9.1 prohibits a solicitor from disclosing any information confidential to a client and acquired during the engagement to anyone other than a solicitor who is a partner, principal, director or employee of the practice, or a barrister or other person engaged by the practice or an associated entity for the purposes of delivering or administering legal services to that client — except as permitted by r 9.2. Rule 9.2 permits disclosure where — 9.2.1 the client expressly or impliedly authorises it; 9.2.2 the solicitor is permitted or compelled by law to disclose; 9.2.3 the solicitor discloses in a confidential setting for the sole purpose of obtaining advice about the solicitor's own legal or ethical obligations; 9.2.4 the solicitor discloses "for the sole purpose of avoiding the probable commission of a serious criminal offence"; 9.2.5 the solicitor discloses "for the purpose of preventing imminent serious physical harm to the client or to another person"; or 9.2.6 the information is disclosed to the insurer of the solicitor, law practice or associated entity. Do not conflate 9.2.4 and 9.2.5 — each is broader than the other in a different direction. Rule 9.2.4 is triggered by the probable commission of a serious criminal offence and requires that avoiding it be the sole purpose; it does not require any physical harm, so it reaches serious financial crime, but the anticipated conduct must rise to the level of a serious criminal offence. Rule 9.2.5 is triggered by imminent serious physical harm; it does not require the harm to constitute any offence at all, so it reaches a client's own self-harm, but it is strictly confined to serious physical harm. Rule 9.2.4 is conventionally directed at offences against third parties; rule 9.2.5 expressly extends to harm to the client themselves. Neither is a general licence to report a client's past offending. Confidentiality is wider than privilege. Rule 9 attaches to all information confidential to the client acquired during the engagement, whether or not it attracts legal professional privilege, and it survives the retainer. Privilege is the evidentiary immunity; confidentiality is the professional obligation. An answer that treats them as the same thing will misstate both the scope and the exceptions.
GATE 6 Is there a conflict? — current clients, former clients, and your own interests (rr 10–12)
Former clients (r 10). Rule 10.1 requires a solicitor and law practice to avoid conflicts between the duties owed to current and former clients. Rule 10.2 prohibits acting for a current client where the practice possesses information confidential to a former client which might reasonably be concluded to be material to the current client's matter and detrimental to the former client if disclosed, unless 10.2.1 the former client has given informed consent to the disclosure and use of that information, or 10.2.2 an effective information barrier has been established. Note the 2022 change: the consent is now to disclosure and use of the information, and the former requirement of written consent to the practice so acting has gone. Current clients (r 11). Rule 11.1 requires the solicitor and the practice to avoid conflicts between duties owed to two or more current clients. Rule 11.2, side-headed "Duty of loyalty", prohibits acting for two or more clients in the same or related matters where their interests are adverse and there is a conflict or potential conflict of the duties to act in each client's best interests, except as permitted by rr 11.3 and 11.4. Rule 11.3 permits acting only where each client is aware the practice also acts for another client and has given informed consent. Rule 11.4, side-headed "Duty of confidentiality", adds that where the practice holds information confidential to one client material to another's matter and detrimental to the first client, it may not act or continue to act unless each client's informed consent either permits disclosure and use of the information or requires an effective information barrier. Rule 11.5 governs an actual conflict arising during the matter and permits continuing for one client only in "exceptional circumstances", requiring both that the departing client has given informed consent and that confidentiality owed to all clients is not put at risk. Rules 11.4.1 and 11.4.2 have different practical consequences, and the distinction is worth a mark. Where each client's informed consent permits disclosure and use of the confidential information (11.4.1), the same solicitor may act for both. Where consent instead requires an information barrier (11.4.2), the practice may act but separate, screened solicitors must represent each client. Rule 11.5 is stricter again: where an actual conflict arises mid-matter the practice must ordinarily cease acting for all the affected clients, and the only exception permitting it to continue for one is where the departing client gives informed consent and confidentiality owed to everyone is preserved. Duty lawyers must cease immediately (r 11A.2). Rule 11A relaxes the conflict-screening obligation for short-term legal assistance services, but the solicitor must immediately cease to act on becoming aware of an adverse current client, or of possessing confidential information material and detrimental to the person assisted. The conflict is imputed to the practice, not confined to the individual solicitor. Rules 10.1 and 11.1 are addressed to "a solicitor and law practice". Allocating a different solicitor within the same firm does not cure the conflict: see Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1998] UKHL 52; [1999] 2 AC 222, where Lord Millett held that the court should intervene unless satisfied that there is no risk of disclosure, the risk needing to be "a real one, and not merely fanciful or theoretical", but which "need not be substantial", with the burden on the firm to establish the effectiveness of its barrier. State the test as "no risk (real, not fanciful, need not be substantial)" — not as "no real risk". In Victoria there is a third route, and it is distinctively ours. Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 248; (2001) 4 VR 501 identifies three bases on which a court may restrain a practitioner from acting: misuse of confidential information; a continuing equitable duty of loyalty surviving termination of the retainer (Brooking JA: the obligation of loyalty "is not observed by a solicitor who acts against a former client in the same matter"); and the inherent jurisdiction over officers of the court to protect the due administration of justice. The loyalty limb remains good law in Victoria and has been repeatedly applied, most conveniently in Schmidt v AHRKalimpa Pty Ltd [2020] VSCA 193. It has been rejected outside Victoria — by Brereton J in Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181; (2005) 64 NSWLR 561, and in the Federal Court in Dealer Support Services Pty Ltd v Motor Trades Association of Australia Ltd (2014) 228 FCR 252. In a Victorian answer you may run the loyalty limb; do not assume it travels. The inherent jurisdiction test, from Kallinicos at [76], asks whether "a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires that a legal practitioner should be prevented from acting", the jurisdiction being exceptional and exercised with caution, and due weight given to a litigant not being deprived of the lawyer of choice without due cause. Co-accused. Acting for two accused in the same proceeding is the paradigm r 11 problem, because the interests of co-accused are latently adverse from the outset and become actually adverse the moment relative culpability is in issue — on a joint plea, on a cut-throat defence, or where one is indemnified. The moment you submit that one client's role was the more culpable, you have acted against that client, and no information barrier cures it. Where the conflict emerges mid-matter, r 11.5 permits continuing for one client only in exceptional circumstances and on both conditions. Your own interests (r 12). Rule 12.1 prohibits acting where there is a conflict between the duty to serve the client's best interests and the interests of the solicitor or an associate, except as permitted by the rule. Rule 12.2, substantially amended in 2022, addresses the exercise of undue influence to advance the solicitor's own or an associate's interests over the client's; r 12.4 regulates drawing a will appointing the solicitor as executor (12.4.1), wills benefiting the solicitor's immediate family (12.4.2), and the receipt of referral fees and commissions (12.4.3). In criminal practice the recurring instances are the fee arrangement, the third-party payer — who is not the client, acquires no right to instruct and no right to information — and the solicitor who is a potential witness (Gate 8). Duty lawyers and short-term services (r 11A). Rule 11A, inserted in 2022, modifies the conflict-screening obligations for short-term legal assistance services where conducting a full conflicts check is not reasonably practicable and delay would risk denying access to legal assistance, subject to disclosure of the nature of the service, the absence of any actual or potential conflict known to the solicitor, and informed consent. This is the rule for the duty-lawyer list and it is easy to miss.
GATE 7 Are you prosecuting? — the minister of justice (r 29)
The character of the role. Rule 29.1 requires a prosecutor to "fairly assist the court to arrive at the truth", to "seek impartially to have the whole of the relevant evidence placed intelligibly before the court", and to assist the court with adequate submissions of law. Rule 29.2 forbids pressing the case for conviction "beyond a full and firm presentation of that case". Rule 29.3 forbids seeking, by language or conduct, to inflame or bias the court against the accused. Rule 29.4 forbids arguing any proposition of fact or law the prosecutor does not believe on reasonable grounds to be capable of contributing to a finding of guilt and to carry weight. The common law expression of the same idea is Whitehorn v The Queen [1983] HCA 42; (1983) 152 CLR 657, where Deane J described the prosecutor as representing the State, obliged to act with fairness and detachment, with departure from those standards capable of amounting to a miscarriage in itself. Disclosure — quote this one exactly. Rule 29.5: "A prosecutor must disclose to the opponent as soon as practicable all material (including the names of and means of finding prospective witnesses in connection with such material) available to the prosecutor or of which the prosecutor becomes aware which could constitute evidence relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused other than material subject to statutory immunity, unless the prosecutor believes on reasonable grounds that such disclosure, or full disclosure, would seriously threaten the integrity of the administration of justice in those proceedings or the safety of any person." Rule 29.6 then requires a prosecutor who has decided not to disclose to consider whether the charge should be withdrawn or reduced to a lesser charge to which the material would not be so relevant. Calling witnesses (r 29.7). The prosecutor must call all witnesses whose testimony is admissible and necessary for the presentation of all the relevant circumstances (29.7.1), and whose testimony provides reasonable grounds to believe it could provide admissible evidence relevant to any matter in issue (29.7.2), unless (i) the opponent consents; (ii) the only matter has been dealt with by an admission on behalf of the accused; (iii) the only matter goes to a point already adequately established by other witnesses; (iv) the prosecutor believes on reasonable grounds the testimony is plainly untruthful or plainly unreliable; or (v) the prosecutor believes on reasonable grounds that the interests of justice would be harmed if the witness were called. There is a proviso: the prosecutor must inform the opponent as soon as practicable of the identity of any witness not to be called on grounds (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v), together with the grounds, unless the interests of justice would be harmed by revealing them. The corresponding common law is R v Apostilides [1984] HCA 38; (1984) 154 CLR 563, set out in section 4 below. Other prosecutorial duties. Rule 29.8 requires a prosecutor with reasonable grounds to believe material may have been unlawfully obtained to promptly inform the opponent if the prosecutor intends to use it and to make a copy available if documentary. Rule 29.9 — "a prosecutor must not confer with or interview any accused except in the presence of the accused's legal representative." Rules 29.10 and 29.11 govern asserting the existence of evidence and correcting the position when it turns out to be unavailable. Rule 29.13 applies rr 29.1, 29.3 and 29.4 to a solicitor appearing as counsel assisting an inquisitorial body. Sentence. Rule 29.12 requires the prosecutor to correct any error made by the opponent in address on sentence, to inform the court of any relevant authority or legislation bearing on the appropriate sentence, and to assist the court to avoid appealable error — and 29.12.4 provides that a prosecutor "may submit that a custodial or non-custodial sentence is appropriate". The prohibition on nominating a specific sentence or numerical range does not come from r 29; it comes from Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; (2014) 253 CLR 58, which held that a submission as to the bounds of the available range is a statement of opinion, not of law or fact, advancing no proposition a sentencing judge may properly take into account, and should neither be sought nor received. Attributing the Barbaro rule to r 29 is a citation error. How r 29.12.4 and Barbaro fit together — the reconciliation is the answer, not the tension. The two are consistent because they operate at different levels of specificity. Identifying whether a custodial or non-custodial sentence is appropriate is a submission about the kind or category of disposition, whereas Barbaro prohibits submissions specifying numerical parameters — a head sentence, a non-parole period, or the bounds of a range. Barbaro expressly preserves the prosecutor's duty to assist the court to avoid appealable error (r 29.12.3), and that duty extends to identifying the kind of sentence disposition that is appropriate or inappropriate. The practical warning is that the line is one of degree: a submission that edges from category into duration re-engages Barbaro. Sentencing remains an exclusively discretionary judicial function; consistency is sought in the application of principle, not in numerical equivalence, and comparable cases are a yardstick rather than a range.
GATE 8 Must you withdraw, and can you? (rr 13, 27)
The general rule (r 13.1). A solicitor with designated responsibility for a matter must ensure completion of the legal services unless 13.1.1 the client has otherwise agreed; 13.1.2 the practice is discharged by the client; 13.1.3 the practice terminates the engagement for just cause and on reasonable notice; or 13.1.4 the engagement ends by operation of law. "Just cause" is now defined (r 13.4, new on 1 July 2026). For the purposes of r 13.1.3, just cause includes — 13.4.1 "instructions that require, or any circumstance where continuation of the engagement would cause, a solicitor to breach his or her ethical duties and professional responsibilities"; 13.4.2 any circumstance where a solicitor is no longer able to act in the client's best interests; and 13.4.3 any circumstance where a client has not provided all information requested of them that is required to fulfil a solicitor's statutory obligations. Rule 13.4.1 is the provision to cite for ethical withdrawal; it was, until 1 July 2026, an implication rather than a text. Why r 13.4 was inserted, and why both new limbs are examinable. The definition was prompted by the anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing obligations extended to legal practitioners under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) from 1 July 2026. Rule 13.4.3 answers the client who will not complete customer due diligence: a practice that is a reporting entity must verify client identity and source of funds, and a client who refuses or fails to provide what is required leaves the practice unable to fulfil its statutory obligations — which is now expressly just cause. Rule 13.4.2 answers something subtler and more interesting: the tipping-off prohibitions mean a practitioner who has formed a suspicion and reported it cannot tell the client, cannot explain why the retainer is stalling, and therefore cannot act in the client's best interests — which is itself just cause to terminate. A candidate who can explain why an AML obligation produces an ethical exit, rather than merely citing the rule, is answering at specialist level. The criminal-specific rule (r 13.2) is the one most likely to be examined and the one most often missed. Where a client is required to stand trial for a serious criminal offence, the client's failure to make satisfactory arrangements for payment of costs will not normally justify termination unless the solicitor or practice has 13.2.1 served written notice of the intention to terminate a reasonable time before the trial date or the commencement of the sittings, giving the client at least 7 days to make satisfactory arrangements, and 13.2.2 given appropriate notice to the registrar of the court in which the trial is listed. Rule 13.3 deals separately with a withdrawn or terminated grant of legal aid, permitting termination on reasonable written notice giving the client a reasonable opportunity to make other arrangements. How you withdraw. Tell the court that you are ethically embarrassed and must withdraw. Do not give reasons — to the court, to the opponent, or to the successor practitioner. The client's instructions remain confidential under r 9.1, and the withdrawal itself must not become the vehicle for the disclosure that rr 20.1.5 and 20.3.3 forbid. Solicitor as witness (r 27). Where it is known or becomes apparent that a solicitor will be required to give evidence material to the determination of contested issues, 27.1 the solicitor may not appear as advocate in the hearing, and 27.2 the solicitor, an associate, or the practice must not continue to act for the client if doing so would prejudice the administration of justice. The 2022 amendment flipped 27.2 from a permission ("may act unless…") to a prohibition; quote the current form.
3. At a glance — dilemma, rule, and what you actually do¶
| The situation | Rule | What you must do |
|---|---|---|
| Client confesses guilt, maintains a plea of not guilty | 20.2 | You may continue, but only within the constraints. You must put the prosecution to proof (20.2.4); you must not suggest another person did it (20.2.2) or set up an affirmative inconsistent case (20.2.3). You must cease to act if the client insists on giving evidence denying guilt or requires a statement of innocence (20.2.8). You do not tell the court (Tuckiar). |
| Client or client's witness has lied, falsified or suppressed, learned mid-hearing or while judgment is pending | 20.1 | Seek authority to inform the court. If the client authorises, inform the court promptly. If not, refuse to take any further part — and you may not inform the court (20.1.5). Note r 20.1.4 was repealed in 2022. |
| You have made a submission that has since become misleading | 19.2 | Correct it as soon as possible. This is mandatory and is not excused by confidentiality; you may correct without disclosing the client's instructions. |
| The prosecutor has made an error you know to be wrong | 19.3 | You are not required to correct it — but you must not adopt or exploit it, and you must not advance any positive case inconsistent with what you know (19.1, 21.3). |
| Client tells you they intend to breach bail, an FVIO or another court order | 20.3 | Advise against it and warn of the dangers; do not advise how to carry it out or conceal it; do not tell the court or opponent unless authorised or you believe on reasonable grounds the conduct is a threat to any person's safety (20.3.3(ii)). |
| You believe a serious offence is about to be committed | 9.2.4 | You may disclose, but only for the sole purpose of avoiding the probable commission of a serious criminal offence. |
| You believe someone is about to be seriously physically harmed | 9.2.5 | You may disclose for the purpose of preventing imminent serious physical harm — to another person or to the client. |
| Two co-accused, interests latently or actually adverse | 11.1–11.5 | Do not act for both. The conflict is imputed to the practice and no internal allocation cures it (Bolkiah). If it arises mid-matter, you may continue for one only in exceptional circumstances and only on both r 11.5 conditions. |
| Former client's confidential information is material and detrimental | 10.2 | Do not act unless the former client has given informed consent to disclosure and use, or an effective barrier exists. In Victoria also consider the Spincode loyalty limb, which can restrain you even with no confidential information at risk. |
| Client will not fund a serious criminal trial | 13.2 | You cannot simply withdraw. Serve written notice a reasonable time before trial giving at least 7 days, and give appropriate notice to the registrar. |
| Continuing would make you breach your ethical duties | 13.1.3 + 13.4.1 | Terminate for just cause on reasonable notice. Tell the court you are ethically embarrassed; give no reasons. |
| You will be a material witness on a contested issue | 27.1, 27.2 | You may not appear as advocate, and the practice must not continue to act if doing so would prejudice the administration of justice. |
| Prosecuting, and material has emerged that helps the defence | 29.5 | Disclose as soon as practicable unless it is subject to statutory immunity, or you believe on reasonable grounds disclosure would seriously threaten the integrity of the administration of justice or the safety of any person — then consider withdrawing or reducing the charge (29.6). |
| Confidential material sent to you by mistake | 31.1–31.3 | Do not use it. Return, destroy or delete it immediately and notify the sender. If you have already begun reading, do not disclose or use it, notify immediately, and stop reading. If instructed by your client to read it, refuse. |
| Client asks you to go surety for their bail | 17.4 | Refuse. "A solicitor must not become the surety for the client's bail." |
4. Prosecution disclosure — the rule, the statute and the cases together¶
Disclosure questions reward candidates who run the professional rule and the statutory regime side by side, because they are not coextensive and each fills a gap in the other. The professional obligation in ASCR r 29.5 is personal to the practitioner, continuing, and not discharged by the view of any other prosecutor. The statutory obligations in the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) are stream-specific, and getting the stream right is a competence signal.
| Stage | Provision | Content |
|---|---|---|
| Summary — full brief | s 41 | Section 41(1)(e) requires "any other information, document or thing in the possession of the prosecution that is relevant to the alleged offence" — including material from persons the prosecution does not intend to call. Section 41(1)(e)(viii), inserted by No 1/2022, adds, subject to s 32C of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958, "a copy of any information, document or thing that is relevant to the credibility of a witness for the prosecution", with a statutory example covering the witness's criminal history and pending charges,** letters of assistance, reduction of charges, other favourable treatment, and any payment or reward for cooperation. |
| The definition of "relevant" | s 41(3) | Inserted by No 5/2025 s 31 (the Justice Legislation Amendment (Committals) Act 2025, in force 28 December 2025): for the purposes of s 41(1)(e), "relevant" includes any information, document or thing that might reasonably be expected to (a) undermine the case for the prosecution; or (b) assist the case for the accused. The mirror provision for the hand-up brief is s 110(2). |
| Continuing — summary | s 42 | Applies to material coming into the informant's possession or notice after service of a preliminary or full brief which would have been required to be listed or served. The informant must serve a copy or list as soon as practicable, and if refusing disclosure must serve written notice of refusal under s 45 identifying the ground. |
| Continuing — committal | s 111 | Applies to material arising after service of the hand-up brief. The informant must serve a copy on the accused, file a copy with the registrar, and forward a copy to the DPP if the DPP is conducting the committal. It does not apply to a plea brief. |
| Continuing — post-committal and direct indictment | s 185 | Applies to material coming into the possession of the prosecution after committal for trial, or held when (or arising after) a direct indictment is filed, which would have been required in the hand-up brief. Service as soon as practicable, subject to s 185A (child abuse material); where the material cannot reasonably be copied, the prosecution must advise of its existence and make it available for inspection. |
| Grounds for refusing | s 45 | The informant may refuse where disclosure would or would be reasonably likely to prejudice an investigation or the administration of the law; prejudice a fair hearing or impartial adjudication; disclose or enable ascertainment of the identity of a confidential source; disclose sensitive methods; endanger the lives or physical safety of law enforcement personnel or persons who have provided confidential information; endanger the life or safety of a protected person or their family member; or result in disclosure of child abuse material to the accused personally. |
| The residual duty | s 416 | "Nothing in this Act derogates from a duty otherwise imposed on the prosecution to disclose to the accused material relevant to a charge", and nothing requires disclosure of material the prosecution is required or permitted to withhold under any Act or rule of law. This is the provision that keeps the common law duty and the professional rule alive alongside the statutory scheme. |
The forensic point: informer status is not an exception to the duty. Section 45(1)© and (e) permit an informant to refuse disclosure on confidential-source grounds, and r 29.5 carves out material subject to statutory immunity — but a claim of public interest immunity is a claim made to the court, not a unilateral assertion by a party, and s 416 preserves the underlying duty. AB v CD (below) is what happens when that boundary is not observed.
5. The authorities¶
| Case | Proposition |
|---|---|
| Giannarelli v Wraith [1988] HCA 52; (1988) 165 CLR 543 | The paramount duty to the court, described by Mason CJ at 556; the duty requires counsel to act in ways that may disadvantage the client. Also the foundation of advocates' immunity in Australia. |
| Tuckiar v The King [1934] HCA 49; (1934) 52 CLR 335 | Counsel whose client confesses guilt must not disclose the admission to the court; the duty is to put the Crown to proof without setting up an affirmative inconsistent case. Conviction quashed and the prisoner discharged. |
| Meek v Fleming [1961] 2 QB 366 (Eng CA) | Misleading the court by half-truth and concealment (the police witness's demotion). A new trial was ordered. The boundary between permissible silence and impermissible concealment. |
| Whitehorn v The Queen [1983] HCA 42; (1983) 152 CLR 657 | The prosecutor represents the State and must act with fairness and detachment; the Crown should ordinarily call all available material witnesses. Departure may itself constitute a miscarriage. |
| R v Apostilides [1984] HCA 38; (1984) 154 CLR 563 | Six propositions: (1) the prosecutor alone decides who is called for the Crown; (2) the judge may inquire into the reasons but cannot adjudicate on their sufficiency; (3) the judge may invite reconsideration at the close of the Crown case but cannot direct that a witness be called; (4) the judge may comment to the jury on the failure to call; (5) save in the most exceptional circumstances the judge should not call a witness personally; (6) a decision not to call will only set aside a conviction where, viewed against the trial as a whole, it produced a miscarriage. |
| Mallard v The Queen [2005] HCA 68; (2005) 224 CLR 125 | Non-disclosure by the prosecution; the cumulation, variety, number and importance of the non-disclosures produced a miscarriage and precluded the proviso. |
| Grey v The Queen [2001] HCA 65; (2001) 75 ALJR 1708 | "The prosecution" for disclosure purposes includes police and investigative agencies, not only the prosecutor's office; a letter of comfort to the principal Crown witness should have been disclosed. There is no CLR report — cite the ALJR. |
| Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; (2014) 253 CLR 58 | A prosecution submission as to the available sentencing range is a statement of opinion, not of law, and should neither be sought by the court nor made. Compare ASCR r 29.12.4, which permits a submission that a custodial or non-custodial sentence is appropriate. |
| Barton v The Queen [1980] HCA 48; (1980) 147 CLR 75 | The decision to present an ex officio indictment is not itself reviewable, but the court retains power to control its process to ensure a fair trial and may stay proceedings — including until a committal is held, absent good reason for departing from the ordinary course. |
| Libke v The Queen [2007] HCA 30; (2007) 230 CLR 559 | Heydon J's catalogue of improper cross-examination by a prosecutor at [127]ff: offensive questioning, comments rather than questions, compound questions, cutting off answers, questions resting on controversial assumptions, and argumentative questions. |
| Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 248; (2001) 4 VR 501 | Three bases for restraining a practitioner in Victoria: misuse of confidential information; a continuing equitable duty of loyalty surviving the retainer; and the inherent jurisdiction. The loyalty limb remains good law in Victoria (Schmidt v AHRKalimpa Pty Ltd [2020] VSCA 193) but is rejected in NSW and the Federal Court. |
| Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1998] UKHL 52; [1999] 2 AC 222 | The court should intervene unless satisfied there is no risk of disclosure; the risk must be real, not fanciful or theoretical, but need not be substantial. The burden is on the firm to establish the barrier's effectiveness. |
| Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181; (2005) 64 NSWLR 561 | The inherent jurisdiction test at [76]: whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires that the practitioner be prevented from acting. Exceptional; exercised with caution. |
| R v Szabo [2000] QCA 194; [2001] 2 Qd R 214 | Defence counsel failed to disclose to his client a prior intimate relationship with the Crown prosecutor. The appeal succeeded on the appearance of injustice notwithstanding otherwise competent conduct of the defence: the principle is counsel's fearless independence and the appearance of it. |
| AB (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym) [2018] HCA 58 | The "Lawyer X" case. Counsel informing against her own clients committed "fundamental and appalling breaches" of her obligations to her clients and her duties to the court; Victoria Police were guilty of "reprehensible conduct"; the prosecutions were "corrupted in a manner which debased fundamental premises of the criminal justice system". The public interest in preserving the informer's anonymity was subordinated to the integrity of the criminal justice system, and the DPP was permitted to disclose her role to the convicted persons. |
| Nudd v The Queen [2006] HCA 9; (2006) 80 ALJR 614 and TKWJ v The Queen [2002] HCA 46; (2002) 212 CLR 124 | The question on appeal is not whether counsel was incompetent but whether the trial miscarried. McHugh J in TKWJ: "flagrant incompetence" is unhelpful as a test. Gleeson CJ in Nudd at [7]: "the concept of miscarriage of justice is as wide as the potential for error". |
| R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 | An accused is generally bound by the way counsel conducts the trial, and errors of judgment or even negligence are not grounds of appeal; but cases may arise, perhaps through flagrant incompetence, involving or causing a miscarriage. The pre-TKWJ formulation. |
| D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 223 CLR 1; Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 16; (2016) 259 CLR 1; Kendirjian v Lepore [2017] HCA 13; (2017) 259 CLR 275 | Advocates' immunity affirmed in D'Orta on finality grounds and extended to advice on plea at committal; confined in Attwells by a functional-connection test to in-court work and out-of-court work leading to a decision affecting the conduct of the case in court; held in Kendirjian not to protect negligent advice on a settlement offer. The immunity has not been abolished and was applied to a criminal-defence negligence claim in Criddle v Monck [2025] WASCA 44. |
| Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW [1957] HCA 46; (1957) 97 CLR 279 | A criminal conviction does not of itself establish unfitness to practise; the conviction must be assessed against the practitioner's general character and fitness. Striking-off set aside and replaced with suspension. |
6. Discipline, fitness and the Victorian regulators¶
The Legal Profession Uniform Law applies as a law of Victoria by force of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic), and the disciplinary definitions sit in ss 296–298. Section 296 defines unsatisfactory professional conduct as including "conduct of a lawyer occurring in connection with the practice of law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent lawyer". Section 297 defines professional misconduct as including (a) unsatisfactory professional conduct where the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence, and (b) conduct occurring in connection with the practice of law or otherwise that would, if established, justify a finding that the lawyer is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice — with s 297(2) directing that fitness be assessed by reference to the matters that would be considered on admission or on the grant or renewal of a practising certificate.
Section 298 lists conduct capable of constituting either: contravention of the Uniform Law; contravention of the Uniform Rules; contravention of the jurisdiction's Application Act; charging more than a fair and reasonable amount for legal costs; conviction for a serious offence, a tax offence or an offence involving dishonesty; becoming an insolvent under administration; becoming disqualified from managing a corporation; failure to comply with a notice requirement; failure to comply with an order of a disciplinary body (including failure to pay a fine); and failure to comply with a compensation order. In Victoria the regulators are the Victorian Legal Services Board (licensing and practising certificates) and the Victorian Legal Services Commissioner (complaints, investigations and disciplinary applications), operating jointly as VLSB+C; disciplinary applications are heard in the Legal Practice List of VCAT, while the Supreme Court retains the power to strike a name from the roll.
7. Conduct in court and dealings with others — the rules that fill out an answer¶
• Independence (r 17) — the solicitor must not act as "the mere mouthpiece of the client or of the instructing solicitor" and must exercise forensic judgments independently (17.1); does not breach duty by confining the hearing to the real issues, presenting the case as quickly and simply as is consistent with robust advancement, or informing the court of persuasive authority against the client (17.2); must not convey a personal opinion on the merits of any evidence or issue (17.3); and must not become the surety for the client's bail (17.4).
• Proper basis (rr 21.3, 21.4) — no allegation of fact in a court document, a submission, an opening or a closing unless the solicitor believes on reasonable grounds that the factual material already available provides a proper basis (21.3); and no allegation amounting to criminality, fraud or other serious misconduct unless there is a proper basis and the client wishes it made after being advised of its seriousness and the consequences if it is not made out (21.4). Rule 21.5 adds that a suggestion in cross-examination on credit requires reasonable grounds to believe acceptance would diminish the witness's credibility.
• Mitigation that blames a third party (r 21.7) — where submissions in mitigation involve allegations of serious misconduct against a person not able to answer them in the case, the solicitor must seek to avoid disclosing that person's identity directly or indirectly unless disclosure is necessary for the proper conduct of the client's case. A recurring criminal-plea hook.
• Questioning alleged victims (rr 21.8–21.9, new in 2022) — in proceedings involving an allegation of domestic or family violence, sexual assault, indecent assault or an act of indecency in which the alleged victim gives evidence, the solicitor must not ask a question or pursue a line of questioning intended to mislead or confuse, or to be unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, humiliating or repetitive, and must take into account any particular vulnerability of the witness in the manner and tone of questioning. Rule 21.9 preserves questioning that challenges truthfulness, consistency or accuracy, or that requires evidence the witness may find offensive, distasteful or private. Read this alongside s 41 of the Evidence Act 2008 (improper questions), which imposes a duty on the court whether or not objection is taken.
• Opponents and witnesses (rr 22–26) — no false or misleading statement to an opponent, and a duty to correct one (22.1, 22.2); no communication with the court in the opponent's absence outside an ex parte application or a hearing of which the opponent has proper notice (22.5); r 23 opposition access to witnesses; r 24 integrity of evidence — influencing evidence; r 25 integrity of evidence — two witnesses together; r 26 communication with witnesses under cross-examination. The words "or misleading" were inserted into r 22 in 2022.
• Public comment (r 28) — a solicitor must not publish or take steps towards the publication of any material concerning current proceedings which may prejudice a fair trial or the administration of justice.
• Other people's errors and material received in error (rr 30, 31) — no taking unfair advantage of another solicitor's or person's obvious error where doing so would obtain a benefit with no supportable foundation in law or fact (30.1); and the three-step inadvertent-disclosure regime in r 31, including the express instruction at 31.3 that a solicitor instructed by a client to read confidential material received in error must refuse to do so.
• Allegations against other practitioners (r 32) — no allegation of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct against another Australian legal practitioner unless made bona fide and on reasonable grounds that available material provides a proper basis for it.
• Dealing with represented and unrepresented persons (rr 33, 34) — r 33 restricts communicating about the subject of the representation with a person known to be represented by another practitioner, subject to consent, urgency, an enquiry as to representation, or notice with no reply after a reasonable time; r 34 prohibits statements that grossly exceed the legitimate assertion of the client's rights and mislead or intimidate, threats to institute criminal or disciplinary proceedings to secure satisfaction of a civil liability, and tactics beyond legitimate advocacy designed primarily to embarrass or frustrate.
8. Corrections carried into this sheet¶
Each of the following appears in circulating study material, including in the model answers and question bank in this project. Each is wrong on the current rule text, and each is the kind of error a marker reads as a competence signal.
| As commonly stated | Status | The correct position |
|---|---|---|
| ASCR r 29.5 carves out material subject to public interest immunity, and requires the prosecutor to inform the opponent that such a claim is made so a ruling can be sought | Corrected | Rule 29.5 carves out "material subject to statutory immunity", and contains no obligation to inform the opponent that a claim is made. The rule's own safety valve is different: disclosure may be withheld where the prosecutor believes on reasonable grounds it would seriously threaten the integrity of the administration of justice or the safety of any person — and r 29.6 then requires consideration of withdrawing or reducing the charge. The PII-must-be-claimed-to-the-court proposition is sound, but its sources are the general law and s 416 CPA, not r 29.5. |
| Rule 29 prohibits the prosecutor from advocating a particular sentence or range | Corrected | Rule 29.12.4 expressly permits a prosecutor to "submit that a custodial or non-custodial sentence is appropriate". The prohibition on a numerical range comes from Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58. |
| R v Szabo is authority on the consequences of a conflict in a joint trial of co-accused | Corrected | Szabo [2000] QCA 194; [2001] 2 Qd R 214 concerns defence counsel's undisclosed prior intimate relationship with the Crown prosecutor and the appearance that counsel had "run dead". It is authority on counsel's fearless independence and its appearance, not on co-accused conflicts. For co-accused, use rr 11.1–11.5, Bolkiah and Spincode. |
| The rule map: r 17 conduct in court; r 20 delay; r 21 ex parte and candour; r 23 opposing conflicts of interest | Corrected | r 17 is "Independence — avoidance of personal bias"; r 20 is "Delinquent or guilty clients"; r 21 is "Responsible use of court process and privilege" (ex parte candour is rr 19.4–19.5); r 23 is "Opposition access to witnesses". Rule 22 (communication with opponents) is correctly stated. |
| Rule 20.1 requires the solicitor to advise that the court should be informed and to request authority | Repealed | That obligation was r 20.1.4 and was repealed on 1 April 2022. The surviving obligation is r 20.1.5: refuse to take any further part unless the client authorises disclosure, inform the court promptly if authorised, and otherwise may not inform the court. |
| Continuing disclosure is s 111 for summary proceedings and s 185 for indictable proceedings | Corrected | There are three provisions: s 42 (summary — after a preliminary or full brief), s 111 (committal — after the hand-up brief), and s 185 (after committal for trial or the filing of a direct indictment). Section 111 sits in the committal chapter, not the summary stream. |
| Rule 20.3 governs a client who has committed a crime or is in breach of an order | Narrowed | Rule 20.3 is engaged only where the client informs the solicitor that the client intends to disobey a court's order — which does reach an intended breach of bail or an intervention order, but does not reach past offending generally. For past or prospective offending outside that frame, the permission to speak is r 9.2.4 (avoiding the probable commission of a serious criminal offence) or r 9.2.5 (preventing imminent serious physical harm). |
| The "just cause" citation rr 13.1.3 and 13.4.1 | Now correct — but newly so | Rule 13.4 was inserted on 1 July 2026 and defines "just cause" for r 13.1.3, with 13.4.1 covering instructions that require, or circumstances where continuation would cause, a breach of ethical duties and professional responsibilities. Before that date the citation had no textual foundation. Do not overlook r 13.2, the criminal-specific 7-day notice and registrar-notification rule. |
| Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 belongs in a counsel-incompetence checklist | Removed | Craig is the leading authority on jurisdictional error and the distinction between inferior courts of law and administrative tribunals. Its only connection is that the underlying stay was granted on Dietrich grounds. Use Nudd, TKWJ and Birks instead. |
| The Bolkiah test is "no real risk" of disclosure | Corrected | Lord Millett's formulation is that the court should intervene unless satisfied there is no risk; the risk "must be a real one, and not merely fanciful or theoretical", but "need not be substantial". The burden is on the firm. |
9. Currency watch¶
• 1 April 2022 — Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors' Conduct Amendment Rules 2022 (2022 No 34) commenced, amending rr 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43 and the Glossary, inserting r 11A and repealing r 41. Key criminal-practice effects: r 20.1.4 repealed; r 20.2 rewritten into eight sub-rules; r 19 renamed "Duty to the court"; rr 21.8–21.9 inserted; r 27.2 flipped to a prohibition; "or misleading" inserted throughout r 22; r 31.2 expanded to three limbs.
• 22 April 2022 — Amendment (No 2) Rules 2022 (2022 No 159) commenced, substituting r 38 (returning judicial officers) to fix unintended consequences for registrars and other non-tenured judicial officers.
• 1 October 2022 — Justice Legislation Amendment (Criminal Procedure Disclosure and Other Matters) Act 2022 (No 1/2022) inserted s 41(1)(e)(viii) (credibility material, subject to s 32C EMPA, with the letters-of-assistance example) and the disclosure-certificate provisions ss 41A and 110A, and s 416A.
• 9 August 2024 — Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2024 (NSW) No 47 made a minor amendment to ASCR r 34.
• 28 December 2025 — Justice Legislation Amendment (Committals) Act 2025 (No 5/2025) s 31 inserted CPA s 41(3), defining "relevant" to include material that might reasonably be expected to undermine the prosecution case or assist the accused. The same Act removed the committal test and reshaped cross-examination at committal.
• 1 July 2026 — Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors' Conduct Amendment Rules 2026 (2026 No 276, published 19 June 2026) commenced, amending r 8 ("must only accept and follow") and r 13 (new r 13.4 defining just cause, including 13.4.3 on information required to fulfil a solicitor's statutory obligations). This is the AML/CTF-driven amendment and it is six weeks old.